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Abstract
It is frequently hypothesized that environmental management systems
(EMSs) may improve a firm’s environmental performance. Whether or not
this hypothesis is true is as important from the perspective of environmental
policyasquestionsrelatingtotherelevantincentivesfor(1)afirm’svoluntary
adoption of an EMS and (2) its environmental innovation behavior.Based on
ample empirical evidence for German manufacturing, this paper addresses
these issues on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explicitly
takes into account that a facility’s decision on innovation activities is corre-
lated with the decision on EMS certification. Our empirical results indicate
that environmental innovation activities are not associated with EMS certifi-
cation nor any other single policy instrument. Rather, innovation behavior
seems to be correlated to the stringency of environmental policy.
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In contrast to conventional innovations, environmental innovations produce a double
rather than single externality - see e. g. CARRARO (2000) and JAFFE,N EWELL, and
STAVINS (2002): In addition to providing the typical positive spill-overs of R&D ac-
tivities, environmental innovations may reduce negative environmental externalities
of production. Although there may be market-based incentives to improve environ-
mental performance, such as cost savings created by process improvements, the public
good character of environmental innovations may require governmental intervention
for their stimulation. For this reason, it is essential to analyze the variety of measures,
including regulatory and market-based instruments, that may provide sufﬁcient incen-
tives to spur environmental innovation within ﬁrms.
ForGermany, considerableempiricalefforthasbeenspentonidentifyingthechar-
acteristics, determinants, and obstacles of environmental innovation at the ﬁrm level,
with the focus on the role of environmental policy - see RENNINGS (2000). In the
early 1990s, ﬁrms began to implement individual environmental management systems
(EMSs), including environmental reports and plans for continuous improvements in
production processes and environmental performance. Since then, the voluntary adop-
tion of international norms, such as the standards of the International Standards Or-
ganization (ISO) 14001 and the European Union Environmental Management and Au-
diting Scheme (EMAS), have become a vital supplement to mandatory environmental
policies based on regulation and legislation, involving the monitoring of environmental
performance and the assessment of achievements.
As an organizational environmental innovation, EMSs may lead to improved en-
vironmental performance; in fact, the econometric analysis of a recent investigation by
RENNINGSet al. (2003) indicates a positive impact of the maturity of EMSs on organiza-
tional environmental innovations. With few exceptions, such as RENNINGSet al. (2003),
the respective German literature is dominated by case studies. Yet, case studies do not
provide a general assessment of the impact of EMSs on innovative activity. As a conse-
1quence, there appears to be a lack of econometric studies on the issue of environmental
innovation based on large-scale surveys at the ﬁrm-level.
On the basis of a unique facility and ﬁrm-level data for German manufacturing
originating from a recent OECD-survey, this paper empirically investigates the signiﬁ-
cance of a variety of incentives for environmentally innovative behavior, including the
inﬂuence of pressure groups, as well as the impact of both regulatory and market-based
policyinstruments, suchaseco-taxesandEMSs. Yet, wefocusonaspectsofpolicystyle,
such as stringency of environmental policy and co-ordination of different policy mea-
sures, rather than on the choice of single policy instruments. In detail, we address the
following questions: What are the relevant incentives for (1) a facility’s voluntary adop-
tion of an EMS. (2) What triggers environmental innovation behavior. These issues are
analyzed on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explicitly takes into ac-
count that the decision on innovation activities within a facility may be correlated to
the decision on EMS certiﬁcation.
Our research complements a substantial body of international empirical evidence
on environmental innovation and the proactive factors that trigger organizational en-
vironmental innovation activities by ﬁrms, such as the voluntary adoption of environ-
mental plans and EMSs. The contribution by HENRIQUES and SADORSKY (1996) is
an early example. Their empirical study on Canada reveals that pressures from cus-
tomers, shareholders, government, and community groups positively inﬂuence ﬁrms’
environmental responsiveness such that ﬁrms formulate “an ofﬁcial plan for dealing
with environmental issues” (HENRIQUES and SADORSKY (1996:382)).
NAKAMURA,T AKAHASHI, and VERTINSKY (2001) empirically explore the deter-
minants that lead large Japanese manufacturers to incorporate environmental goals in
their decisions and obtain EMS certiﬁcation. These authors conclude that, in addition
to ﬁrm size and factors that affect company proﬁts, managers’ environmental values,
beliefs, and attitudes – variables that have been derived from survey responses and
explicitly integrated in their probit models – are important determinants of Japanese
companies’ voluntary commitment to environmental objectives.
2While these studies investigate the underlying motives for voluntary organi-
zational innovation activities, such as the adoption of EMSs, DASGUPTA,H ETTIGE,
and WHEELER (2000), KHANNA and ANTON (2002) as well as ANTON,D ELTAS, and
KHANNA (2004) explain the variability in the quality of EMSs, proxied by the count of
environmental management practices. In their seminal paper, ANTON,D ELTAS, and
KHANNA (2004) also examine what effects the adopting of an EMS has on environmen-
tal performance. DASGUPTA, HETTIGE, and WHEELER (2000), ﬁnally, conclude that
the voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 management practices signiﬁcantly improves the
compliance status of Mexican ﬁrms.
In the following section, we theoretically discuss the relationship of environmen-
tal innovation and regulation. Section 3 describes our data set. Section 4 presents the
conceptual framework, in particular the employed discrete choice model. Our esti-
mation results are discussed in Section 5. The last section presents a summary and
conclusions.
2 Environmental Innovation and Regulation
According to e. g. KEMP and ARUNDEL (1998), and RENNINGS and ZWICK (2002), the
notion of environmental innovation encompasses new and modiﬁed processes, tech-
niques, practices, and products that reduce or even avoid detrimental environmen-
tal impacts. Environmental innovation can be divided into technical or organizational
measures, with EMS being an example of organizational innovation. Technical mea-
sures include new or modiﬁed products and processes. In the speciﬁc case of EMSs,
the question is whether or not such management systems induce technical changes in
addition to organizational changes.
To date, the literature on the relationship between environmental policy and
technological change has mainly focused on the choice of an optimal policy instru-
ment to induce environmental innovation, see JAFFE,N EWELL, and STAVINS (2002).
3For a long time, market-based instruments have been regarded as superior (DOWNING
and WHITE (1986); MILLIMAN and PRINCE (1989)), a characterization that has been
conﬁrmed for situations of perfect competition and information. Yet, under conditions
of imperfect competition, results originating from general equilibrium models of en-
dogenous growth and game theory models suggest that regulation standards may be
a more appropriate method for stimulating innovation, particularly when ﬁrms gain
“strategic advantages” from innovation, see CARRARO (2000) and MONTERO (2002).
Furthermore, assuming that technological innovation is endogenous, no instrument is
generally preferable and the welfare gain of environmental policy instruments heav-
ily depends on circumstances, see FISCHER,P ARRY, and PIZER (2003). With particular
respect to the use of either auctioned permits or taxes in environmental politics, RE-
QUATE(1998) ﬁnds that whether auctioned permits or taxes provide stronger incentives
to adopt an improved technology depends upon empirical values of relevant parame-
ters.
These ﬁndings evoke the question as to whether or not evaluating and comparing
single policy instruments is an appropriate approach to determine the optimal policy
for stimulating environmental innovation. This “instrumentalism” in environmental
policy, i.e. the assumption that it is the proper selection of the most appropriate policy
instrument that guarantees policy success, is criticized by NORBERG-BOHM (1999) and
BLAZEJCZAK et al. (1999). More important elements of a successful policy are, accord-
ing to these authors, the mix of instruments and the stringency of environmental policy,
including aspects such as legal enforcement and ﬁnes.
With particular respect to regulation as a determinant of environmental innova-
tion, the importance of strictness in environmental policy has been emphasized by the
PORTER hypothesis, for which a unanimous formulation, though, is not yet available –
see JAFFE and PALMER (1997:610). PORTER and VAN DER LINDE (1995a; 1995b) argue
that in a non-optimizing world, strict environmental policy may spur “innovation off-
sets” that “can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations, but
can even lead to absolute advantages over ﬁrms in foreign countries not subject to sim-
4ilar regulations” (PORTER and VAN DER LINDE (1995a:98). Similarly, ASHFORD,A YERS,
and STONE (1985) argue that strict regulation can induce fundamental technological
changes in ﬁrms.
These arguments are based on a series of case studies, most prominently PORTER
and VAN DER LINDE (1995a; 1995b). To date, only a few econometric studies appear to
have been performed on the relationship between policy stringency and environmental
innovation. In the econometric work of both JAFFE and PALMER (1997) and BRUNNER-
MEIER and COHEN (2003), environmental expenditures of ﬁrms have been used as a
proxy for policy stringency. While BRUNNERMEIERand COHENobtain a signiﬁcant im-
pact of environmental expenditures on environmental innovation, JAFFE and PALMER
ﬁnd no such empirical evidence. Our study complements the empirical evidence on
potential promotion factors for environmental innovation, with particular emphasis on
the role of EMSs.
Traditionally, German environmental policy has emphasized mandatory regula-
tion that imposes limits on pollutant emissions or prescribes the use of speciﬁc abate-
menttechnology. Whilethiskindofregulationcertainlyhasprotectedtheenvironment,
it has also encouraged ﬁrms to focus on end-of-pipe technologies that control pollution
at the factory smokestack, rather than on preventing pollution. Mandatory regulation
has also tended to impose higher costs on both ﬁrms and regulators. The growing belief
that ﬁrms need higher ﬂexibility relating to the achievement of environmental goals –
which is generally supposed to lower their cost – has led to an increasing number of
voluntary initiatives to change corporate culture and management practices by incor-
porating environmental concerns in production decisions.
Emphasizing pollution prevention at the source as the preferred method of pol-
lution control, these policy initiatives include the voluntary adoption of EMSs. Based
on the implications of EMS certiﬁcation, such as the monitoring of environmental per-
formance and the assessment of achievements, EMSs are assumed to improve envi-
ronmental performance by enhancing companies’ environmental innovation activities.
This assumption, however, has yet to be validated.
53 Data and Variables
Our facility and ﬁrm-level data set of German manufacturing originates from a recent
OECD survey on environmental policy tools, which was performed in 2003 in 7 OECD-
countries, such as the US, Japan, and Germany. The major task of the survey was to
analyze the EMS-adoption decision of facilities. The German data set is based on 899
valid questionnaires, including questions relating to facility- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc charac-
teristics, environmental behavior, and perception of the stringency of environmental
regulation.
Almost half of our sample, i.e. 437 out of 899 facilities, has considered introducing
an EMS. 246 facilities have even established such a system already, while implementa-
tion is in progress in 62 facilities. In our model presented in the subsequent section, the
dichotomous variable ems indicates the implementation of an EMS in a sample facility
or that implementation is in progress. The most important reasons why ﬁrms contem-
plate introducing EMSs are – according to the answers of our survey respondents – the
wish to foster corporate image, economize on both waste management and resource
input, and increase efforts to achieve regulatory compliance.
Whether or not a facility has undertaken signiﬁcant changes in production tech-
nologies and/or product characteristics to reduce the environmental impacts associ-
ated with its activities, is captured by the dichotomous variable abate. This variable
indicates the implementation of such measures, irrespective of their type, i. e. additive
end-of-pipe technology versus process-integrated technology changes. Total private
expenditures on R&D and the number of successful patent applications are innovation
activity measures that are typically employed in the economic literature – see e.g. JAFFE
and PALMER (1997:611). In the absence of patent data for our sample facilities, and due
to a lack sufﬁcient data on environmental R&D expenditures, we identify technological
environmental innovation by the variable abate.
A facility’s decision on both EMS certiﬁcation and abatement activities depends
6on factors that are divided into the following four categories1: (1) Pressure groups: This
category reﬂects the inﬂuence – as perceived by the survey respondents – of public
authorities (captured by the variable authorities), interest groups such as industrial as-
sociations and labor unions (summarized in the variable unions), internal forces, such
as corporate headquarters and management employees, commercial and private cus-
tomers, and environmental (green) organizations. (Cursive terms stand for the names of
the variables as used in the tables presenting our estimation results.) Our summary
of the responses to the question of the inﬂuence of pressure groups on environmental
practices indicates that internal stakeholders are more important than external forces,
such as public authorities, commercial customers, and environmental organizations –
see FRONDEL et al. (2004).
(2) Motivations: This category includes expected corporate image improvements
and cost savings due to EMS certiﬁcation and environmental innovation and also en-
compasses factors such as potential avoidance of environmental incidents and achieve-
ment of compliance with environmental regulation. Our descriptive summary of the
survey results reveals that corporate image, cost savings, regulatory compliance, and
the prevention of incidents are the most relevant motivations – see FRONDEL et al.
(2004).
(3) Environmental policy tools: This category comprises respondents’ assessment
of the importance of market-based instruments, such as environmental taxes, regulatory
measures (input bans and technology standards), information measures, as well as subsi-
dies. All these policy instruments may have an impact on the intention to both acquire
an EMS and establish abatement measures. The stringency of the governments envi-
ronmentalpolicymayalsofosterthesedecisions. Howthesurveyrespondentsperceive
the stringency of environmental regulation is described by the variable policy stringency.
1All variables are constructed from the answers provided by the survey respondents. This approach
is far from unproblematic, since these responses reﬂect both genuine variations across facilities and in-
dividual differences in the perception of the respondents. For descriptive statistics and details on con-
struction, see Table A in the appendix. An extensive description of the survey and its results is provided
in FRONDEL et al. (2004)
7What is most interesting in this context is that the vast majority of our sample facilities
assess German environmental policy as only moderately stringent or not at all strin-
gent, 47.7 % versus 32.1 % – see FRONDEL et al. (2004).
(4) Covariates: Both decisions may be affected by a set of covariates that include
facility size, measured in terms of number of employees, and the relevance of environ-
mental impacts of any kind of pollution. Focusing on facility size and prevalence of
EMS certiﬁcation, we ﬁnd a strong positive correlation: It turns out that larger facili-
ties adopt EMSs more frequently than smaller facilities do – see FRONDEL et al. (2004).
In order to control for industry-speciﬁc differences, ten industry dummy variables are
created in which similar industry sectors are pooled. Finally, two other factors might
be relevant: the existence of an environmental department and persons explicitly re-
sponsible for environmental concerns, indicated by department and ofﬁcer, respectively.
Both factors may also be interpreted as organizational environmental innovation. In
contrast to EMS, though, these organizational innovations typically had already been
established in facilities a long time before the decision on EMS certiﬁcation was at issue.
4 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a bivariate discrete-choice model that explicitly takes into account
that the decision on environmental innovation or abatement activities within a facility
is correlated to the decision on EMS certiﬁcation. Therefore, our model is formulated
as a system of two latent-variable equations with normally distributed and correlated
disturbances: one for a facility’s abatement decision and a second for the EMS adoption
decision.
In formal terms, we assume that a facility’s propensity for abatement activities,
abate∗
i, depends on, among other things, emsi, the actual implementation of an EMS in
facility i, whereas facility i’s propensity for EMS acquisition, ems∗
i, is not affected by
8the abatement propensity abate∗
i or actual abatement:
abate
∗
i = θ · emsi + x
 





iβ − ξi. (2)
The error terms η and ξ are assumed to be normally distributed vectors with zero mean.
By including emsi as a regressor in equation (1), we check whether or not there is a
direct correlation between the abatement and EMS adoption decisions, rather than only
an indirect correlation. Note that this recursive simultaneous-equation model will be
logically inconsistent if the EMS adoption equation (2) contains abatei, the observed
abatement decision of facility i. The intuitive argument indicating logical inconsistency
is the resulting circular reasoning, while the statistical reason for inconsistency relies
on the fact that the four probabilities P(abatei =1 ,emsi =1 ) ,P(abatei =1 ,emsi =
0),P(abatei =0 ,emsi =1 )and P(abatei =0 ,emsi =0 )necessarily add to unity – see
e. g. MADDALA (1983) for more details on simultaneous discrete-choice models.
Both sets of regressors, xi andyi, include variables belonging to the four categories
of variables described in the previous section. It is important to note that the set of
observable variables xi in abatement decision equation (1) is partly common to the set
of regressors yi in EMS adoption equation (2), but not identical. If both sets xi and yi
do not differ in at least one variable, and if η and ξ are not independent, i. e. ρ  =0 , the
parameters in (1) are not identiﬁed. To see this, consider the special case in which xi and
yi are both constants – see MADDALA (1983:122). In this case, four parameters, α,β,θ
and ρ, are to be estimated, but sample information would allow us to determine only
three probabilities, while the fourth is obtained as residual. From three probabilities,
though, we cannot estimate four parameters.
The propensities abate∗
i and ems∗
i are typically unobservable. Instead, only bi-
nary choices are observed. Therefore, we need to impose the conditions Va r(η)=I,
Va r(ξ)=I, where I denotes the unity matrix. Moreover, Cov(η,ξ)=ρI  =0 , with
ρ reﬂecting a non-idiosyncratic correlation of both decisions in ﬁrms – see e. g. MAD-
DALA (1983:122) for this speciﬁc kind of model, which is called a recursive model. It is
most likely that the disturbances ηi and ξi are correlated, since these disturbances may
9capture unobserved variables, such as “green” preferences of the management and its
attitude towards innovation. Such unobservable factors would affect both the abate-
ment and adoption decision and may contaminate our estimation results (simultaneity
problem): In particular, the estimate of parameter θ, conceived to capture environmen-
tal innovation effects due to EMS certiﬁcation, may also reﬂect the inﬂuence of common
unobservable driving forces, rather than the genuine impact of EMS certiﬁcation. Being
aware of the potential existence of simultaneity problems due to common unobservable
factors, we shall interpret our estimation results with caution.
An ideal solution to such a simultaneity problem would be performing an appro-
priate and well-designed experiment in which EMSs are not adopted on a voluntary
basis2. Rather, the ﬁrms that implement an EMS are randomly determined by a regula-
tor (treatment group). While such an experimental approach appears to be unrealistic,
the effect of potential unobservable driving factors would be eliminated through the
randomization process: In effect, if sample sizes are sufﬁciently large, randomization
will generate a complete balance of all relevant observable and unobservable charac-
teristics across treatment and control groups, thus facilitating comparability between
experimental treatment and control groups. Then, true impacts of EMS certiﬁcation
on environmental innovation activities could be elicited by comparing the innovation
behavior of treatment and control groups on the basis of, for instance, a difference-
in-differences approach. A more realistic, feasible approximation to an experimental
design would be given if EMS certiﬁcation were mandatory in one country, but un-
usual in another, comparable country. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the data set
received from the OECD survey.
Rather than observing the propensities abate∗
i and ems∗
i, merely the corresponding
actions – that is, the actual implementation of EMSs, indicated by emsi=1, and actual
abatement activities (abatei = 1) – can be observed, provided that these propensities
exceed a certain threshold, which is – without any loss of generality – commonly set at
2See FRONDEL and SCHMIDT (2001) for a survey on experimental and non-experimental evaluation
approaches to environmental policy instruments.
10zero:
abatei =1 , if abate
∗
i > 0, abatei =0 otherwise, (3)
emsi =1 , if ems
∗
i > 0, emsi =0 otherwise. (4)
From an economic perspective, the interpretation of condition (3) is that a proﬁt-






iβ − ξi > 0. (5)
In economic terms, the propensity ems∗
i of facility i to adopt an EMS is determined by
the net beneﬁt. This unobservable net beneﬁt depends on observable factors, for ex-
ample, image improvements that are captured in vector yi, as well as on unobservable
factors that are summarized in disturbance ξi. Of course, similar interpretations hold
for environmental innovations: A proﬁt-maximizing facility invests in abatement mea-
sures, abatei=1, if the net beneﬁt abate∗
i > 0 is positive.
Generally, bivariate probit models are estimated using Full-Information-
Maximum-Likelihood (FIML) methods3. On the basis of this estimation procedure,
no problem arises due to the endogenous nature of emsi in equation (1): It is correct
to simply ignore the simultaneity in our model by treating emsi as if it were an exoge-
nous variable. The explanation for this procedure is given by GREENE (2000:849) and
is based on the fact that the term P(abatei =1 |emsi =1 )· P(emsi =1 ) , for instance,
which enters the log-likelihood, equals the joint probability P(abatei =1 ,emsi =1 ) .
Of course, if unobservable heterogeneity is such that the disturbance vectors η and ξ
are independent, one can obtain consistent estimates by estimating both equations sep-
arately and using ordinary single-equation probit ML methods. Yet, we do not know
3Note that two-stage procedures – similar to two-stage least squares in linear simultaneous-equations
models, for which one ﬁrst performs a probit ML estimation of equation (2) and then substitutes Φ(z 
iˆ δ)
for emsi – would not provide consistent estimates of the parameters of the abatement decision equation
(1) – see MADDALA (1983:123). By contrast, such a two-stage procedure would be correct if the variable
abate∗
i were observable rather than latent – see MADDALA (1983:120).
11whether or not this is the case unless we test the null-hypothesis H0 : ρ =0upon FIML
estimation of system (1) and (2).
5 Empirical Results
Estimation results for our recursive bivariate probit model are reported in Table 1. First
of all, on the basis of a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test, we do not reject the hypothesis H0 :
ρ =0 : Upon accounting for the inﬂuence of all factors included in equations (1) and (2)
– for example, the role of pressure groups –, the LR statistic of 0.642 <χ 2
0.995( 1 )=7 .89
indicates that unobserved variables might be uncorrelated4. In order to circumvent
identiﬁcation problems, the sets xi and yi have to differ from each other in at least one
variable if η and ξ are not independent. We thus have assumed that environmental
innovation activities are not motivated by expected image improvements and that the
existence of an R&D budget related to environmental matters, indicated by the dummy
variable R&D, does not affect the decision to adopt an EMS5. That is, R& D has only
been included in abatement equation (1), while image only occurs in equation (2).
In line with the stylized facts presented in the previous section, our estimation
results6 indicate that EMS certiﬁcation is strongly correlated to an expected enhance-
4On the basis of a WALD test, whose test statistic 0.713 equals the square (−0.260/0.308)2 of the t ratio
for ρ, we come up with the same conclusion. Due to the large number of variables included in both
equations, and owing to a fairly large number of missing values for some of these variables – as is the
case for policy stringency, the survey respondents’ impression of environmental regulation stringency –
the remaining number of observations employed in the estimation amounts to 728, rather than 899, the
overall number of valid questionnaires.
5These assumptions are conﬁrmed by the estimation of the single equation probit models, including
image and R&D.
6Sampleselectionbiasesmay, ofcourse, beconsideredproblematic. Infact, theshareoflargerfacilities
in terms of employees is higher in our sample than in the population of facilities of German manufactur-
ing. For larger facilities, it is in turn more likely that an environmental department is established and an
employee exists who is explicitly responsible for environmental matters. These persons are most likely
to have completed our questionnaires. Since we control for the existence of such persons, there should
12ment of corporate image, while expected cost savings are negatively associated with
EMS certiﬁcation, probably because survey respondents expect EMS certiﬁcation to be
costly. In contrast, neither the occurrence of environmental incidents nor achievement
of compliance with environmental regulation seem to be important motivations for ei-
ther decision. Policy stringency has, in statistical terms, a signiﬁcantly positive impact
on environmental innovation and abatement activities. In contrast, the stringency of
environmental policy does not seem to be correlated to EMS certiﬁcation.
Table 1: FIML-Estimation Results for our Recursive Probit Model System (1) and (2).
Equation abate ems Equation abate ems
Motivations Covariates
image –– ∗∗0.451 (3.18) ofﬁcer ∗∗0.472 (2.65) ∗∗0.980 (6.11)
incidents 0.035 (0.28) -0.117 (-0.83) department 0.137 (0.77) ∗∗0.719 (5.49)
compliance 0.107 (0.75) 0.239 (1.62) impacts ∗∗0.394 (2.96) 0.015 (0.11)
policy stringency ∗∗0.526 (3.44) 0.009 (0.05) R&D 0.399 (1.09) ––
cost savings 0.232 (1.93) ∗-0.289 (-2.22) size 1.6·10−4 (1.30) ∗∗4.7·10−4 (3.58)
Policy Instruments Industry Dummies
voluntary measures 0.126 (0.181) -0.101 (-0.55) food ∗0.786 (2.28) 0.497 (1.38)
subsidies -0.125 (-0.88) 0.096 (0.61) textile 0.279 (0.75) -0.809 (-1.78)
market instruments 0.026 (0.22) -0.199 (-1.48) paper 0.623 (1.93) 0.034 (0.10)
regulatory measures 0.196 (1.65) -0.076 (-0.58) chemicals ∗0.697 (2.11) 0.560 (1.68)
information -0.134 (-0.78) 0.216 (1.20) minerals ∗0.850 (2.05) -0.530 (-1.15)
ems 0.559 (1.08) –– metals 0.491 (1.64) -0.083 (-0.25)
Pressure Groups machines 0.171 (0.57) -0.297 (-0.09)
internal forces ∗∗0.397 (2.88) ∗∗0.410 (3.11) transport –– ––
authorities ∗-0.295 (-2.04) -0.102 (-0.68) recycling 0.351 (0.62) 0.881 (1.53)
customers -0.099 (-0.77) 0.046 (0.34) wood ∗∗1.137 (2.62) -1.272 (-1.87)
unions -0.169 (-0.66) 0.139 (0.52) Constants
green organizations 0.092 (0.49) 0.102 (0.52) cons. ∗∗-1.450 (-4.86) ∗∗-1.986 (-5.81)
Note: Z-statistics are in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively. Number of observa-
tions: 728. Log-Likelihood: -701.59. χ2(57) = 417.75: The hypothesis that all slope coefﬁcients are jointly zero has to be rejected.
be no sample bias caused by this mechanism.
13It is surprising that none of the various environmental policy tools included in
our model, whether market-based or regulation-based instruments, appears to be im-
portant for a facility’s decision in favor of EMS and pollution abatement. With particu-
lar respect to the role of EMS certiﬁcation for environmental pollution, our estimation
results do not indicate any association of a facility’s abatement activities with EMS cer-
tiﬁcation. These ﬁndings seem to be in line with the widely discussed hypothesis that
policy style is more important for innovation than single policy instruments. Further-
more, our econometric analysis reveals that among pressure groups, internal forces have
a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the decision for the establishment of both EMSs
and abatement measures. Apart from public authorities, which are likely to push abate-
ment activities, external forces, such as customers, do not seem to be inﬂuential with
respect to either decision.
Not surprisingly, the existence of at least one employee who is explicitly responsi-
ble for environmental concerns, indicated by the dummy variable ofﬁcer, displays a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant positive correlation to the introduction of both abatement activities
and EMSs within a facility. The existence of an environmental or a related department,
indicated by department, only exhibits a positive statistical effect on EMS certiﬁcation,
but not on pollution abatement activities. As one might expect, abatement activities
are most likely triggered by strong environmental impacts of a facility’s production pro-
cesses: More polluting facilities seem to be more inclined to innovate and abate than
less polluting facilities.
In perfect accord with the previous section, which reports that EMS adoption is
strongly correlated to facility size, EMS certiﬁcation is more likely in larger facilities,
which tend to have the capacity for such an organizational environmental innovation.
However, larger facilities do not seem to spend more effort on abatement activities. Fi-
nally and not surprisingly, there are industry-speciﬁc differences: abatement activities
are more common in the chemical and plastic products sector, for instance, than in any
other industry.
In order to estimate marginal effects, we exploit the result that the null-hypothesis
14H0 : ρ =0cannot be rejected. We thus assume that there is no correlation between
the disturbance vectors η and ξ of equations (1) and (2) and consistent estimates can be
obtained by estimating both equations separately using ordinary single equation probit
ML methods. The marginal effects of both single equation estimations are reported in
Table 2. In qualitative terms, our single equation estimation results reiterate the pattern
already observed from Table 1.
Table 2: Marginal Effects originating from Single Equation Probit Estimations.
Equation abate ems Equation abate ems
Motivations Covariates
image –– ∗∗0.146 (2.94) ofﬁcer ∗∗0.224 (4.47) ∗∗0.305 (6.27)
incidents 0.010 (0.20) -0.036 (-0.76) department 0.092 (1.86) ∗∗0.251 (5.61)
compliance 0.058 (1.13) 0.075 (1.51) impacts ∗∗0.157 (3.19) 0.025 (0.54)
policy stringency ∗∗0.198 (3.50) 0.017 (0.30) R&D 0.154 (1.14) ––
cost savings 0.080 (1.74) ∗-0.094 (-2.18) size 0.8·10−4 (1.94) ∗∗1.5·10−4 (3.46)
Policy Instruments Industry Dummies
voluntary measures 0.047 (0.67) -0.027 (-0.45) food ∗∗0.287 (2.56) ∗∗0.174 (1.37)
subsidies -0.047 (-0.83) 0.026 (0.49) textile 0.087 (0.62) ∗ -0.227 (0.62)
market instruments 0.001 (0.03) -0.075 (-1.66) paper 0.226 (1.97) -0.009 (-0.07)
regulatory measures 0.072 (1.55) -0.027 (-0.60) chemicals ∗∗0.275 (2.51) 0.178 (1.54)
information -0.042 (-0.63) 0.090 (1.43) minerals ∗0.269 (1.95) -0.1784 (-1.43)
ems 0.055 (1.06) –– metals 0.184 (1.62) -0.061 (-0.59)
Pressure Groups machines 0.068 (0.58) -0.043 (-0.41)
internal forces ∗∗0.157 (3.59) ∗∗0.148 (3.31) transport –– ––
authorities ∗-0.127 (-2.29) -0.040 (-0.82) recycling 0.177 (0.90) 0.305 (1.42)
customers -0.032 (-0.63) 0.036 (0.75) wood ∗∗0.329 (2.50) -0.271 (-1.91)
unions -0.049 (-0.49) 0.006 (0.07) Constants
green organizations 0.042 (0.57) 0.017 (0.26) cons. –– ––
Exclusively facility-related internal factors, such as management personnel and
enhancement of corporate image, appear to be important for the decision in favor of
EMS certiﬁcation, rather than external incentives and forces, such as regulatory pres-
15sure. Therefore, apart from general policy stringency and the inﬂuence of public au-
thorities, these internal factors are likely to be the driving force for a facility’s abatement
activities. In sum, we do not ﬁnd any empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the
choice of a single policy instrument determines the environmental innovation behavior
of ﬁrms. It is the policy style, comprised of policy stringency, policy implementation,
and co-ordination of different measures, that seems to be more important.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The major question addressed in this paper is: How can public authorities support the
introduction of, speciﬁcally, environmental management systems (EMSs), which can be
interpreted as an organizational environmental and technical innovation that may lead
to improved environmental performance? On the basis of a unique facility and ﬁrm-
level data set for German manufacturing, we ﬁnd that facility-related internal factors
and incentives, such as potential enhancement of the corporate image, and, hence, ra-
tional self-interest, may explain a ﬁrm’s decision for the voluntary adoption of an EMS,
a result also obtained by KHANNA and ANTON (2002:556). In contrast, neither exter-
nal pressure groups nor any single policy instrument tends to push EMS certiﬁcation.
Accepting these results, it would be advisable to focus environmental policy on stim-
ulating internal factors in order to enhance voluntary adoption of EMSs, for instance,
through the opportunity to employ certiﬁcation as a marketing instrument for ﬁrms
that are already validated.
In addition to internal forces and incentives displaying a statistically positive im-
pact on innovation activities of facilities, the inﬂuence of public authorities and the
strictness of environmental policy seem to be catalysts for innovation and abatement
activities. By contrast, neither EMS certiﬁcation nor any other single policy instrument
appears to affect environmental innovation and abatement behavior. These empirical
results are in line with the widely known hypothesis that factors of policy style, such
as the stringency of their design and implementation, trigger ﬁrm decisions in favor of
16innovation and abatement activities.
Our results are also in accordance with KINGand LENOX(2000), who hypothesize
thatwhiletheadoptionofanEMSmayinsulateﬁrmsfromstakeholderpressure, itdoes
not necessarily trigger environmental innovation. NASH and EHRENFELD (2001) pre-
sume that, in the absence of sanctions on lack of improvement, ﬁrms may develop an
EMS to disguise poor performance and avoid regulatory scrutiny, but will not make the
effort required to really improve environmental performance. According to ANTON,
DELTAS, and KHANNA (2004), EMSs do not necessarily guarantee improved environ-
mental performance, as most EMSs solely focus on the means – that is, the proactive
efforts for pollution control – rather than the ends – that is, the actual environmental
performance.
ANTON,D ELTAS, and KHANNA (2004) also ﬁnd that none of the market-based
or regulatory pressures considered have a signiﬁcant direct impact on the pollution in-
tensity of ﬁrms. Rather, their effect is indirect and operates through the adoption of a
higher quality EMS that, in turn, has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the intensity of
toxic emissions. In sum, on the basis of our paper’s empirical results, we conclude that
policy style, including policy stringency and the mix of different policy instruments,
deserves at least as much attention in environmental politics as the proper choice of an
appropriate policy instrument.
17Appendix
Table A provides the list of variables included in our bivariate recursive probit model.
Without exception, all variables are derived from survey responses. Apart from size –
the variable capturing the number of facility employees –, all variables are constructed
as dummy variables, generally indicating whether or not the response option “very
important” has been selected for a certain question7.
Table A: Description and Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Motivations for environmental practices:
image Corporate image 0.262 0.440
incidents Prevent or control environmental incidents 0.385 0.486
compliance Regulatory compliance 0.524 0.450
policy stringency Stringency of environmental policy 0.202 0.412
cost savings Cost savings 0.342 0.475
Environmental policy instruments:
voluntary measures Voluntary or negotiated agreements 0.130 0.337
subsidies Subsidies, tax preferences 0.205 0.404
market instruments Market-based measures: Taxes, tradable permits, 0.593 0.499
liability for environmental damages
regulatory measures Regulatory measures: input bans, performance 0.438 0.497
and technology standards
information Information measures for consumers 0.157 0.364
For example, image characterizes whether or not the corporate image is a very im-
portant motivation for environmental practices of a facility. There are two exceptions to
this rule: policy stringency = 1 indicates whether respondents assess the general policy
regime as very stringent, while policy stringency = 0 means moderately or not stringent.
7Alternatively, we have constructed dummy variables that reﬂect both the response options “very im-
portant” and “important”. In qualitative terms, estimation results for our model based on such dummy
variables are the same.The variable impacts indicates very negative environmental impacts of a facility’s prod-
ucts and production process with respect to at least one of the following issues: water
efﬂuents, air pollution, waste generation, etc.
Table A, continued: Description and Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Vari-
ables.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Pressure groups:
internal forces Corporate headquarters, employees, shareholders 0.555 0.497
authorities Public authorities 0.438 0.497
customers Private and commercial consumers, 0.291 0.455
unions Industrial associations, labor unions 0.059 0.237
green organizations Environmental organizations, neighborhood groups 0.125 0.331
Covariates:
department Existence of an environmental or related department 0.438 0.496
ofﬁcer Existence of a person explicitly responsible for environmental
concerns 0.658 0.475
impacts Importance of environmental impacts 0.258 0.438
size Number of a facility’s employees 476.5 3801.2
R&D Existence of an R&D budget related to environmental matters 0.036 0.187
Industry Dummies (ISIC Codes):
food Food products, beverages and tobacco (15-16) 0.086 0.280
textile Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear(17-19) 0.045 0.206
paper Pulp paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21-22) 0.102 0.303
chemicals Chemical, fuel, rubber and plastic products (23-25) 0.166 0.372
minerals Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 0.039 0.194
metals Basic metals and fabricated metal products (27-28) 0.235 0.424
machines Machinery, electrical and optical equipment (29-33) 0.253 0.435
transport Transport Equipment (34-35) 0.036 0.185
recycling Recycling (37) 0.011 0.185
wood Wood and wood products, furniture (20, 36) 0.029 0.168References
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